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Abstract
Statistical agencies and other organizations that disseminate data are obligated to pro-
tect data subjects’ confidentiality. For example, ill-intentioned individuals might link
data subjects to records in other databases by matching on common characteristics
(keys). Successful links are particularly problematic for data subjects with combina-
tions of keys that are unique in the population. Hence, as part of their assessments of
disclosure risks, many data stewards estimate the probabilities that sample uniques on
sets of discrete keys are also population uniques on those keys. This is typically done
using log-linear modeling on the keys. However, log-linear models can yield biased es-
timates of cell probabilities for sparse contingency tables with many zero counts, which
often occurs in databases with many keys. This bias can result in unreliable estimates
of probabilities of uniqueness and, hence, misrepresentations of disclosure risks. We
propose an alternative to log-linear models for datasets with sparse keys based on a
Bayesian version of grade of membership (GoM) models. We present a Bayesian GoM
model for multinomial variables and offer an MCMC algorithm for fitting the model.
We evaluate the approach by treating data from a recent US Census Bureau public
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use microdata sample as a population, taking simple random samples from that pop-
ulation, and benchmarking estimated probabilities of uniqueness against population
values. Compared to log-linear models, GoM models provide more accurate estimates
of the total number of uniques in the samples. Additionally, they offer record-level
predictions of uniqueness that dominate those based on log-linear models.
KEY WORDS: Contingency table; Confidentiality; Disclosure; Grade of membership;
Latent class.
1 Introduction
Many organizations view sharing record-level data with others as an integral part of
their mission. For example, federal statistical agencies disseminate public use files
on individual persons, businesses, schools, farms, etc. Principal investigators running
large data collection efforts share their data with researchers who are not on the orig-
inal investigative team. Funding agencies like the National Institutes of Health and
National Science Foundation mandate that their grantees make data available to others
to promote new discoveries and reproducible research.
When sharing data, organizations are ethically and often legally obligated to protect
the confidentiality of data subjects’ identities and sensitive attributes. Thus, organiza-
tions must assess the risks that ill-intentioned individuals, henceforth called intruders,
can learn confidential information from any proposed data release. These risks arise
when intruders can link records in the released data to other databases (that include
direct identifiers) by matching on variables common to the two databases. For example,
Sweeney (2001) famously showed that 97% of the records in publicly available voter
registration lists in Cambridge, MA, could be uniquely identified using birth date and
nine digit zip code. By matching on the information in these lists, she was able to
identify Governor William Weld in an anonymized medical database.
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In this article, we consider a key aspect of disclosure risk assessment: estimating
whether or not a record has a set of discrete characteristics, say Y, that are unique
in the population. Population uniques are at comparatively high risk of identification
disclosure; for example, when an intruder matches a released record to a record in an
external database based on Y, the intruder’s match is guaranteed to be correct (assum-
ing no errors in the matching process or data sources) when the record is a population
unique on those characteristics. The number of population uniques in the sample is
used as a file-level measure of the disclosure risk associated with releasing the sampled
data (Bethlehem et al., 1990; Greenberg and Zayatz, 1992; Skinner, 1992; Skinner et al.,
1994; Chen and Keller-McNulty, 1998; Fienberg and Makov, 1998; Samuels, 1998; Pan-
nekoek, 1999; Dale and Elliot, 2001; Elamir and Skinner, 2006; Forster and Webb, 2007;
Skinner and Shlomo, 2008). Population uniqueness also factors into record-level dis-
closure risk measures for data that have been altered to protect confidentiality (Reiter,
2005; Drechsler and Reiter, 2008; Shlomo and Skinner, 2010).
Typically in sampled data, the organization does not know which records are pop-
ulation uniques on Y; rather, it only knows that records are unique, or not, in the
sample. A variety of approaches have been developed to estimate probabilities that
records are population uniques given that they are sample uniques. Most are based
on cell probabilities in the table of Y that are estimated with log-linear models; see
Skinner and Shlomo (2008) and the references therein.
Log-linear models have potential shortcomings for estimating population unique-
ness. When tables are large and sparse, as is often the case with high-dimensional
Y, estimates of cell probabilities from log-linear models can be distorted by the many
random zero counts in the table. Typically, this results in overestimation of the pop-
ulation counts and, thus, underestimation of the true risks of identification disclosures
(Skinner and Shlomo, 2008). This sensitivity to sparsity is an intrinsic limitation of
maximum likelihood estimation for log-linear models (Bishop et al., 1975; Erosheva
et al., 2002); we discuss it further in Section 6. Additionally, it is not obvious how
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to select the terms, e.g., the order of interactions, to include in the models. However,
estimates of the number of population uniques can change dramatically for different
specifications (Skinner and Shlomo, 2008). Finally, when one considers the possible
inclusion of high-order interactions for high-dimensional Y, the number of potential
log-linear models can be so large that evaluating all of them becomes infeasible.
To facilitate the process of log-linear model choice, Skinner and Shlomo (2008) de-
veloped principled criteria specific to the estimation of population uniqueness. They
employ these criteria in stepwise model searches to identify log-linear models for dis-
closure risk estimation. Another perspective on model selection was offered by Forster
and Webb (2007), who restrict the log-linear models to the sub-class of decomposable
graphical models and use Bayesian model averaging to account for model uncertainty.
We propose to use a Bayesian version of the grade of membership (GoM) models
(Woodbury et al., 1978; Erosheva et al., 2007) to estimate probabilities of population
uniqueness in large, sparse contingency tables. GoM models have been shown to be
particularly effective for estimation of cell probabilities in such tables; for example,
they have been applied on 216 sparse contingency tables in studies of disability among
elders (Erosheva, 2002; Erosheva et al., 2007). Using an empirical study based on
public use microdata from the state of California, we find that the GoM models deliver
superior estimates of the number of population uniques compared to estimates based
on log-linear models with the criteria of Skinner and Shlomo (2008). The GoM models
also result in more accurate record-level predictions of uniqueness than the log-linear
models, resulting in fewer false negatives (record estimated not to be population unique
when it is) with similar rates of false positives (record estimated to be population unique
when it is not).
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe
measures of identification disclosure risk based on population uniques that we use
throughout. In Section 3, we present a GoM model for multinomial variables and an
MCMC sampler for its Bayesian estimation. In Section 4, we show how to compute
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the risk measures using the GoM models. In Section 5, we empirically compare the
performance of the GoM model to several approaches based on log-linear models using
the California data. In Section 6, we conclude with a discussion of implementing the
GoM model for disclosure risk assessment in practice.
2 Identification Disclosure Risk Measures
To provide context for the measures of identification disclosure risk, we begin by fram-
ing the setting of interest. An organization has collected a sample of n records from
a finite population of size N . For each record i = 1, . . . , N , let Yi = (Yi1, Yi2, ..., YiJ)
be the individual J × 1 vector of key variables. The key variables are those from the
sample deemed by the organization to be available to intruders in other data sources.
Specifying the key variables is a challenging task; we refer readers to the literature on
identification disclosure risk assessment for advice on key specification (e.g., Duncan
et al., 2011, Chapter 2). We suppose that, for j = 1, . . . , J , the components Yij are
discrete random variables with nj ≥ 2 levels. For convenience, we label the levels of
each Yij using consecutive integers from one to nj . Thus, Yi ∈ C =
∏J
j=1{1, 2, ..., nj}
for all i. Following the literature on identification disclosure risk, we do not consider
continuous key variables as they essentially imply that every record is a population
unique. We ignore all variables in the sample that are not keys, since they are not
available to intruders for matching.
We consider each Yi in the population to be a realization from a common para-
metric super-population distribution indexed by θ, Yi
iid∼ Pθ. The population can be
summarized by a contingency table, F, with counts in each cell x ∈ C of the table
defined as Fx =
∑N
i=1 I(Yi = x), where I(·) = 1 if the argument is true and I(·) = 0
otherwise. For every x ∈ C, let Pxθ = Pr(Y = x) be the probability of being in cell
x. The population cell count distribution is then multinomial with sample size N and
probabilities {Pxθ }. For large N and small cell probabilities, which is generally the case
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in practice, a reasonable approximation is Fx ∼ Poisson(NPxθ ).
Moving now to the sample, we suppose that it is collected from the population
following a Bernoulli sampling design with cell-homogeneous selection probabilities,
pix. The sample also can be summarized as a contingency table, f , with cell counts fx.
Using the Poisson approximation for the population cell count distribution, we have
fx ∼ Poisson(pixNPxθ ). As J and the number of levels nj in the keys increase, the size
of the number of cells in f increases exponentially. This has the effect of producing
tables where the number of cells greatly exceeds the sample size n and, consequently,
many cells have fx = 0, i.e., the sample table is sparse.
The organization has only f and does not know F; hence, it does not know which
records are unique in the population on Y. Therefore, following common practice in
disclosure risk assessment (e.g., Skinner and Holmes, 1998; Skinner and Shlomo, 2008),
we seek to estimate the probability of being unique in the population conditional on
being unique in the sample,
µx = Pr(Fx = 1|fx = 1), (1)
for all x such that fx = 1. Under the Poisson distributions for F and f , we have
µx = exp (−NPxθ (1− pix)) . (2)
Thus, an estimate of Pxθ , e.g., from a log-linear model on f , results in an estimate of
µx.
For a measure of file-level risk, we consider the number of sample uniques that are
also population uniques,
τ =
∑
x∈C
I(Fx = 1, fx = 1). (3)
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The quantities τ and µx are related to each other through the identity
E[τ |f ] =
∑
{x:fx=1}
µx, (4)
so that the estimates of µx can be used to estimate τ .
When using model-based frameworks such as the one here, population quantities
like Fx and τ are random variables; that is, they are generated from a super-population
process. Thus, when estimating the variability of Fx and τ , we should account for two
sources of uncertainty: the estimation of the super-population model from F and the
estimation of F from f . We refer readers to Rinott and Shlomo (2007) for discussion
of this issue for (non-Bayesian) log-linear modeling contexts.
3 Grade of Membership Models
In GoM models, we assume the existence of a small number of latent classes, which can
be interpreted as typical cases or extreme profiles of individuals in the population. How-
ever, rather than force each individual to be fully characterized by only one extreme
profile, GoM models assume that individuals lie somewhere in between extremes. They
allow individuals to share characteristics from each of the extreme profiles simultane-
ously with varying degrees determined by their position with respect to the extreme
profiles. GoM models belong to the general class of mixed membership models (Ero-
sheva, 2002; Erosheva et al., 2004), in which individuals are allowed membership in
more than one class simultaneously. Models from this family have been proposed for
a wide range of applications, including the study of disability among elders (Manton
et al., 1994; Erosheva et al., 2007), network analysis (Airoldi et al., 2008), electoral pref-
erences analysis (Gormley, 2006; Gormley and Murphy, 2008), estimation of judgment
accuracy (Cooil and Varki, 2003), estimation of population sizes (Manrique-Vallier and
Fienberg, 2008), genetic composition analysis (Pritchard et al., 2000) and text classi-
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fication (Erosheva et al., 2004; Blei et al., 2003; Blei and Lafferty, 2007). Like other
latent structure models, mixed membership models offer an approach to the analysis
of large, sparse contingency tables with complex interactions. In contrast, log-linear
models sometimes can be inadequate for analysis of such tables, because sparsity often
prevents the estimation of structurally required high order terms.
To construct a GoM model, we first set the number of extreme profiles, K. We
characterize these profiles as follows. For any individual that is a full member of the
kth extreme profile, i.e., does not belong to any profile but k, we require that Pr(Yij =
l|ith individual in kth class) = λjk[l], where l ∈ {1, 2..., nj} and
∑nj
l=1 λjk[l] = 1. Hence,
all individuals of an extreme profile have the same probability distributions for Y. It
is important to emphasize that the extreme profiles are latent and idealized; in reality
there might not be any individuals who are full members of extreme profiles.
We next characterize the sampled individuals by associating each of them with its
own K-dimensional membership vector, gi = (gi1, gi2, ..., giK), representing how much
of a member of each class this particular individual is. Membership scores are restricted
so that all gik > 0 and
∑K
k=1 gik = 1. We call the geometry implied by the possible
values of gi and extreme profiles the K − 1 dimensional unit simplex, and denote it
by ∆K−1 or simply ∆ when no ambiguity arises. We introduce the idea of partial
membership by setting the distribution of each Yij given gi as the convex combination,
p(yij |gi) = Pr(Yij = yij |gi) =
K∑
k=1
gikλjk[yij ]. (5)
This characterization based on convexity is the defining characteristic of the GoM
model. Geometrically, it implies that all individuals lie in the convex hull defined by
the extreme profiles, with relative positions expressed by their membership vectors
in barycentric coordinates with respect to the vertices. For additional study of the
geometry of the GoM model, see Erosheva (2005).
We further assume that the J variables in Yi are conditionally independent given
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gi. This condition, sometimes referred as latent conditional independence or local
independence (Holland and Rosenbaum, 1986; Sijtsma and Junker, 2006), expresses the
idea that the membership vector completely explains the dependence structure among
the J manifest variables. With this assumption, we can construct the conditional joint
distribution as
p(yi|λ,gi) =
J∏
j=1
K∑
k=1
gikλjk[yij ]. (6)
Assuming that the membership vectors all come from a common population-level dis-
tribution G with support in ∆ (gi
iid∼ G), we have the GoM model likelihood
p(yi|λ, G) =
∫
∆
J∏
j=1
K∑
k=1
γkλjk[yij ]G(dγ), (7)
where γ = (γ1, ..., γk).
The net effect is to represent the potentially huge contingency table (with n1×n2×
...×nJ cells) using only K extreme profiles, individually mixed according to a common
distribution G. Thus, the GoM model offers significant reductions of dimensionality.
3.1 The GoM model as a latent class model
If we restrict the support of G from ∆ to just its vertices (so that if γ ∼ G, then γk = 1
for some k and γk′ = 0 for any k
′ 6= k), the expression in (7) simplifies to
p(yi|λ, G) =
K∑
k=1
pik
J∏
j=1
λjzj [yij ] (8)
where pik = Pr(γk = 1). This expression corresponds to a finite mixture of multinomial
distributions, i.e., a latent class model (Goodman, 1974). Thus, we can view GoM
models as a generalization of latent class models, where we allow membership vectors
to take values from any position in the unit simplex instead of just its vertices.
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Somewhat paradoxically, GoM models also can be characterized as a subclass of
certain restricted latent class models (Haberman, 1995; Erosheva et al., 2007). To see
this, consider again the expression in (7). Under the assumption gi
iid∼ G, we have
p(yi|λ, G) =
∫
∆
J∏
j=1
K∑
k=1
γkλjk[yij ]G(dγ) =
∑
z∈Z
piz
J∏
j=1
λjk[yij ], (9)
with z = (z1, ..., zJ) ∈ Z = {1, 2, ...,K}J and piz = EG
[∏J
j=1 γzj
]
. This expression,
typical of a discrete mixture model, suggests the augmented data representation of the
GoM model,
p(yi, zi|λ,gi) =
J∏
j=1
K∏
k=1
(
gikλjk[yij ]
)I(zij=k)
, (10)
where now we are considering individual zi = (zi1..., ziJ) ∈ Z. For details, see Erosheva
et al. (2007).
3.2 MCMC sampler for the multinomial GoM model
Erosheva (2002) and Erosheva et al. (2007) use the latent class representation in (10)
to develop an MCMC algorithm for sampling from the posterior distribution of a full
Bayesian GoM model for binary Yij . We now extend it to datasets with some nj > 2,
as is typical for key variables in practice.
To begin, we specify the distribution G for membership vectors as
p(gi|α) = Dirichlet(gi|α), (11)
with parameter α = (α1, . . . , αK). Based on the likelihood in (10), the joint posterior
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distribution of the GoM parameters is
p(α,λ,g|y, z) ∝p(λ)p(α)
(
n∏
i=1
p (gi|α)
)
×
n∏
i=1
J∏
j=1
K∏
k=1
(
gikλjk[yij ]
)I(zij=k)
. (12)
As prior distributions for λs, we use p(λjk[.]) = Dirichlet(1nj ), i.e., a uniform on
the simplex ∆nj−1. Following Erosheva et al. (2007), we adopt the well known Dirich-
let parametrization α0 =
∑
k αk and ξ = (α1/α0, ..., αK/α0), and specify independent
prior distributions for α0 and ξ. Parameter ξ is the expected value of the distribu-
tion. Parameter α0 governs the concentration of the distribution. Small values of α0
concentrate the distribution towards the vertices of ∆ in proportions given by ξ; large
values concentrate the probability towards the expected value ξ.
We use the hyperprior distributions α0 ∼ Gamma(2, 1) and ξ ∼ Dirichlet(1K),
where the gamma distribution is in shape/inverse-scale parametrization. These distri-
butions express a priori ignorance about ξ and a slight preference for small values of
α0. This preference for small values is based more on structural modeling decisions
than expressions of prior knowledge: we regard individuals as belonging principally to
a single extreme profile, but with influence from the others. In our empirical work, we
have found that posterior distributions of α0 tend to be strongly data-dominated (see
the online appendix for evidence), but prior specifications with increased mass towards
higher values of α0, e.g., Gamma[2, 0.1], cause the Markov chains to exhibit relatively
poor convergence properties.
To sample from the posterior distribution of the parameters, we use Gibbs sampling
with Metropolis-Hastings steps when needed. The MCMC sampler can be implemented
with successive applications of the following four steps.
1. For every i ∈ {1 . . . n} and j ∈ {1 . . . J}, sample
(zij | . . . ) ∼Discrete(p1, p2, ..., pK) (13)
11
with pk ∝ gik · λjk[yij ] for all k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}.
2. Sample each λjk[·] from its full conditional distribution,
p(λjk[·]| . . . ) ∝ p(λjk[·])×
n∏
i=1
λ
I(zij=k)
jk[yjk]
= Dirichlet(λjk|1nj )×
n∏
i=1
nj∏
l=1
λ
I(zij=k,yjk=l)
jk[l]
(14)
∝ Dirichlet
(
1 +
n∑
i=1
I(yij = 1, zij = k), ..., 1 +
n∑
i=1
I(yij = nj , zij = k)
)
(15)
3. Sample each gi independently from its full conditional distribution,
(gi| . . . )∼Dirichlet
(
α1 +
J∑
j=1
I(zij = 1), α2 +
J∑
j=1
I(zij = 2), . . . , αK +
J∑
j=1
I(zij = K)
)
.
(16)
4. To sample α, we first note that its full conditional distribution,
p(α|...) ∝Gamma(α0|τ, η)×Dirichlet(ξ|1K)×
n∏
i=1
Dirichlet(gi|α) (17)
∝ατ−10 exp[−α0η]×
[
Γ (α0)∏K
k=1 Γ(αk)
]n K∏
k=1
[
n∏
i=1
gik
]αk
, (18)
does not have a recognizable form. Thus, we use a Metropolis-Hastings within
Gibbs step. We treat the vector α as a block and use the logarithmic scale,
Gaussian random walk Metropolis-Hastings step proposed in Manrique-Vallier
and Fienberg (2008):
(a) Sample each component of α∗ = (α∗1, α∗2, ..., α∗K), as independent lognormal
variates from
α∗k
indep.∼ lognormal(logαk, σ2). (19)
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(b) Let α∗0 =
∑K
k=1 α
∗
k, and compute
r = min
{
1, exp
[−η(α∗0 − α0)]
(
K∏
k=1
α∗k
αk
)(
α∗0
α0
)τ−1
×
[
Γ(α∗0)
Γ(α0)
K∏
k=1
Γ(αk)
Γ(α∗k)
]n K∏
k=1
(
n∏
i=1
gik
)α∗k−αk}
,
(20)
and update the chain, from step m to step m+ 1, according to the rule
α(m+1) =
 α
∗ with probability r
α(m) with probability 1− r.
(21)
This estimation algorithm does not take the data collection design into considera-
tion; thus, it is appropriate only for ignorable sampling designs such as simple random
sampling. We comment further on fitting GoM models with complex sampling designs
in Section 6.
4 GoM Models for Disclosure Risk Estimation
In this section, we describe how to apply the GoM model to estimate the disclosure
risk quantities µx and τ from the sampled data. In what follows, we assume that F has
been generated from a GoM model with implied probabilities {Pxθ }, where θ = (α,λ).
From (2), the posterior distribution of each µx is a function of its corresponding
cell probability, Px(α,λ), so that
p(µx|f) = p
(
exp[−NPx(α,λ)(1− pix)]
∣∣∣ f) . (22)
The cell probabilities are themselves functions of α and λ, whereby
Px(α,λ) =
∫
∆
J∏
j=1
K∑
k=1
γkλjk[xj ]Gα(dγ). (23)
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Generalizing a result from Manrique-Vallier and Fienberg (2008), given α and λ, these
probabilities can be computed with the closed-form formula,
Px(α,λ) =
Γ(α0)
Γ(α0 + J)
∑
z∈Z
 K∏
k=1
Γ
(
αk +
∑
j I(zj = k)
)
Γ(αk)
×
J∏
j=1
λjzj [xj ]
 . (24)
This suggests that we sample θ from its posterior distribution and compute (24) to
get a draw of µx based on (22). However, (24) contains a sum over K
J terms which,
while finite, quickly becomes unmanageable for models with a large number of extreme
profiles or datasets with a large number of variables. In practice, therefore, we approx-
imate (24) for given θ using Monte Carlo integration. In the empirical examples in
Section 5, we find that Monte Carlo sample sizes as small as 5, 000 result in reasonably
accurate estimates of even very small cell probabilities.
As evident in (3), the file-level risk measure, τ , is a function of both the observed
sample, f , and the unobserved population, F, so that its posterior distribution requires
integration over the posterior distribution of populations of size N . This is analytically
intractable. However, as with µx, we can use a Monte Carlo approach to sample τ given
draws of θ. Let (α(m),λ(m)) be the mth sample from the posterior distribution of θ.
Then, to obtain the mth draw of τ , we apply the following algorithm.
1. Let F(m) = f , i.e., initialize the population table as the sample table
2. For each remaining individual in the population i ∈ {n+ 1, n+ 2, ..., N},
(a) Sample membership vector g
(m)
i ∼ Dirichlet(α(m))
(b) For each variable j ∈ {1, 2, ..., J}
i. sample z
(m)
ij ∼ Discrete(g(m)i )
ii. sample y
(m)
ij ∼ Discrete(λ(m)jz(m)ij )
(c) Let F
(m)
x = F
(m)
x + 1, where x corresponds to the simulated cell value of Yi
3. Let τ (m) =
∑
x∈C I(F
(m)
x = 1, fx = 1)
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This procedure generates a contingency table, F(m), from a simulated population com-
prising the n individuals from the sample and N −n responses sampled from the GoM
model conditional on (α(m),λ(m)). This process is akin to methods for Bayesian fi-
nite population inference (Gelman et al., 2004, Chapter 7). Although we use these
simulated populations only to compute τ , in principle they can be used to generate
posterior predictive samples from any finite-population quantity of interest, including
µx and population counts for x such that fx > 1. They might also be used to create
synthetic public use files (Rubin, 1993; Reiter and Raghunathan, 2007).
Another estimate of τ can be obtained by replacing µx in (4) with some point
estimate µˆx—we use posterior medians in the empirical application—resulting in
τˆ =
∑
{x:fx=1}
µˆx. (25)
This is the basic form of the estimator employed by Skinner and Shlomo (2008), who
use log-linear models to compute µˆx. The estimator in (25) has the computational ad-
vantage of reusing estimates of µx that may have been produced otherwise. However,
because (25) is actually an estimator of E[τ |f ] rather than of τ , posterior intervals or
other estimates of uncertainty associated with (25) do not incorporate the uncertainty
from sampling F from a super-population. In our empirical evaluations, the estima-
tor in (25) and the Monte Carlo simulation procedure result in nearly identical point
estimates of τ . We take this as further evidence of the quality of the Monte Carlo pro-
cedure used to approximate (24). However, since the population simulation procedure
produces full posterior distributions and not just point estimates, we prefer it to (25)
for estimation purposes.
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n Populated Cells Sample Uniques τ
1, 000 863 (.02%) 763 44
5, 000 3,230 (.09%) 2,518 205
10, 000 5,478 (.15%) 4,015 411
Table 1: Three samples from the CA file. The number of individuals in the population is
N = 1, 150, 934, and the total number of cells in the contingency tables is 3, 600, 000.
5 Application to Census Data
To evaluate the performance of GoM models, we use data from the 5% public use
microdata sample of the U.S. 2000 census for the state of California. The data are
available via the Integrated Public Microdata Services (IPUMS, Ruggles et al., 2010).
We treat all N = 1, 150, 934 individuals older than 21 years as the population, and
specify ten key variables for Y (variable label and nj in parentheses): number of
children (A, 10 levels), Age (B, 10 levels), sex (C, 2 levels), marital status (D, 6 levels),
race (E, 5 levels), education (F, 5 levels), employment status (G, 3 levels), income (H,
10 levels), disability (I, 2 levels) and veteran status (J, 2 levels). For all but age and
income, the levels are defined in the IPUMS file. We categorize age and income into
deciles. The resulting contingency tables for both population and samples have a total
of 3,600,000 cells. Because we include only individuals older than 21, there are no
impossible combinations of responses, such as married 3 year olds.
We select three independent, simple random samples of sizes n ∈ {1000, 5000, 10000},
and in each sample estimate the number of sample uniques that are population uniques.
Table 1 displays relevant summaries of the three samples. The vast majority of the
cells in each f are empty; for instance, even with the largest sample, the resulting
contingency table has only 5, 478 of the 3, 600, 000 cells with non-zero counts. We
note that simple random sampling differs slightly from Bernoulli sampling described in
Section 2, but for small sampling fractions like those here the Bernoulli sampling with
pix = n/N is a reasonable approximation to simple random sampling.
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In each sample, we compare the GoM model estimates with estimates obtained from
the application of three log-linear models on sampled Y : the independence model,
the no second order interaction (NSI) model, and the log-linear model chosen via
the application of the method proposed by Skinner and Shlomo (2008) (henceforth
the SS approach). Independence models are rarely rich enough for disclosure risk
estimation purposes and we include them here primarily for reference purposes. NSI
models have been found to produce reasonable results in many cases (Fienberg and
Makov, 1998; Elamir and Skinner, 2006; Skinner and Shlomo, 2008) and so represent
a default modeling position. The SS approach is more complicated to employ than
the Independence or NSI models, but the empirical evaluations of Skinner and Shlomo
(2008) suggest that it outperforms both the Independence model and the NSI model;
thus, it is the primary benchmark against which we will judge GoM model estimates.
Skinner and Shlomo (2008) present two criteria for evaluating log-linear models that
are tuned to estimate disclosure risk quantities. The first—recommended by Skinner
and Shlomo (2008) and used here—is to select the log-linear model that minimizes a
standardized estimate of the bias of an estimator of τ2 =
∑
xE[1/Fx|fx = 1] (B2/
√
ν,
in the notation of Skinner and Shlomo, 2008). To find this model, we follow the SS
approach by running a forward stepwise search procedure based on the minimization of
B2/
√
ν, stopping when there is no evidence of underfitting. Further details including
the sequence of fitted models, test statistics, and estimates of τ in the stepwise searches
are provided in the online appendix. The second criterion uses a test statistic associated
with τ (B1/
√
ν in the notation of Skinner and Shlomo, 2008). We found similar results
with either criterion and so report only results with B2/
√
ν.
For the GoM approach, analysts need to specify the number of extreme profiles K.
In our experience, and as evident in Figure 1, as K increases the posterior medians
of the disclosure risk quantities tend to stabilize on what can be considered the best
GoM estimates. This behavior suggests an empirical method for choosing K. Starting
from a simple model with a small number of extreme profiles, progressively fit more
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Figure 1: Posterior medians of τ obtained from GoM models for different K for the three
samples, along with error bars indicating 95% equal-tail posterior predictive credible inter-
vals. Also included are the actual value of τ and the estimates obtained from the application
of log-linear models using independence (Indep), no second order interactions (NSI), and the
Skinner and Shlomo (2008) model selection criterion (SS).
complex models and compute the posterior predictive estimate of τ for each of them.
Once the estimates have stabilized around a particular value, choose the model with
the smallest K that leads to that estimate. For computational expediency we recom-
mend incrementing K by multiples of three to five in initial explorations, with greater
multiples for larger n.
Following these guidelines, we selected models with K = 6, K = 20 and K = 30
for the samples with n = 1000, n = 5000, and n = 10000, respectively. Table 2
displays the estimates of τ for these models together with the results from the three
log-linear models. The GoM model estimates are a clear improvement over those
obtained through log-linear modeling. We note that past the point of stabilization, the
exact number of extreme profiles does not make any practical difference. For instance,
the estimates for the sample with n = 10, 000 obtained from the selected model with
K = 30 are essentially the same as those obtained with K = 35 and K = 45 and very
similar to those obtained with K = 40. This is true for the individual measures of risk
µx as well.
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n Model τ τˆ 95%-Interval
1,000 GoM (K = 6) 44 48 [39, 57]
Log-linear - Indep. 63.6
Log-linear - NSI 22.1
Log-linear - SS1 57.6
5,000 GoM (K = 20) 205 206 [188, 225]
Log-linear - Indep. 289.5
Log-linear - NSI 190.2
Log-linear - SS2 185.4
10,000 GoM (K = 30) 411 412 [385, 439]
Log-linear - Indep. 559.2
Log-linear - NSI 414.6
Log-linear - SS3 396.9
1 Indep. + [BD]
2 NSI + [DGH]
3 NSI + [BEH][DGH]
Table 2: Estimates of the number of sample uniques that are also population uniques using
log-linear models and GoM models for the three samples. Point estimates for GoM models
are posterior medians; 95% intervals are equal tail posterior credible intervals.
To evaluate the performance of the GoM approach at the individual-record level,
we consider the disclosure risk prediction as a classification problem: given a sample
unique (fx = 1, observable) we wish to classify it as a population unique (Fx = 1,
not observable) or a population multiple (Fx > 1, not observable). A natural way of
achieving this is to consider decision rules akin to those in record linkage problems
(Fellegi and Sunter, 1969), e.g., a sample unique is classified as a population unique (a
positive) when µˆx > κ1 and is classified as not a population unique (a negative) when
µˆx < κ2, where κ2 < κ1. The cutoffs κ1 and κ2 are set by the agency to calibrate
the misclassification rate to tolerable levels. A procedure for finding optimal values of
(κ1, κ2) is an open problem that goes beyond the scope of the present work.
Figure 2 displays the fractions of false positives, (# of false positives)/(Sample uniques −
τ), and false negatives, (# of false negatives)/τ , as a function of (κ1, κ2) for the SS
log-linear and GoM models. For n = 1, 000, both methods perform similarly, which
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is expected given the similarity of the estimates for τ in Table 2. For n = 5, 000 and
n = 10, 000, the GoM models clearly outperform the SS log-linear models in terms of
false negative rates no matter which κ1 we choose, while the false positive rates are
very similar. Arguably, false negatives are more problematic than false positives for
organizations releasing data. Hence, for these samples, we conclude that the individ-
ual uniqueness assessment using the GoM approach offers improvements (in terms of
accuracy of disclosure risk estimates) over the same task using log-linear models.
To illustrate the advantage of the GoM approach from another perspective, Figure 3
displays false negative rates implied by given false positive rates when setting κ1 = κ2,
which forces every record to be classified. When n = 1000 both techniques again
perform similarly. When n = 5000 or n = 10000, the implied false negative rate is
always smaller for GoM models for any possible false positive level.
6 Discussion
The empirical evaluations show that using GoM models to estimate disclosure risk
quantities can improve on previously suggested methods based on log-linear models,
including what we consider to be the state of the art model selection technology of
Skinner and Shlomo (2008). This improvement can be observed in both aggregated as
well as individual measures of disclosure risk. Of course, any empirical evaluation is
necessarily limited in breadth, and there may well be other settings where the GoM
model does not perform as well as the best log-linear models.
As noted by Skinner and Shlomo (2008) and verified in our empirical work, differ-
ent log-linear models can yield very different estimates of the disclosure risks. This
applies for the class of GoM models as well: different numbers of extreme profiles yield
different estimates of the measures of interest, typically monotonically decreasing as
K increases. However, this decreasing trajectory appears to stabilize after reaching
a specific threshold in the number of extreme profiles. Past that threshold, all GoM
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Figure 2: Fraction of false positives and false negatives in the three samples for classifications
obtained with SS log-linear and GoM models as a function of the classification cutoff points.
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Figure 3: Fraction of false positives vs. fraction of false negatives in the three samples for
full classifications (κ1 = κ2) obtained with SS log-linear and GoM models.
21
models with a larger number of extreme profiles yield essentially the same estimates,
which are either comparable or a clear improvement over those obtained from log-linear
smoothing. In the empirical evaluations, we found similar patterns of stabilization with
K for posterior estimates of other quantities useful for disclosure risk estimation; see
the online supplement for details. We note that Manrique-Vallier and Fienberg (2008)
observed related stabilizing behavior in the context of finite population size estimation
with GoM models.
An important advantage of Bayesian implementations of GoM models over the use
MLE-based log-linear estimates—which we believe helps explain the superior accuracy
of GoM estimates in this context—is their tolerance to sparsity. In log-linear modeling,
it is well known that certain patterns of zeros in contingency tables lead to the non-
existence of maximum likelihood estimates (see Rinaldo, 2005; Eriksson et al., 2006;
Dobra et al., 2008); for example, patterns causing margins corresponding to the highest
order terms in hierarchical log-linear models to have zeros. This is a common situation
in datasets with a large number of variables with several levels, whereby the number
of cells greatly exceeds that of the individual records. For instance, in the datasets
used in Section 5, nearly all of the 3.6 million cells are empty; in fact, even in the
most populated table we have 99.85% empty cells. This in turn causes many low order
marginal tables—even some two-way tables—to have random zeros. Parameters for
cells with those zero margins are inestimable, so that those cells have to be assumed
to have expected values equal to zero (Bishop et al., 1975). However, this basically
treats the responses corresponding to those cells as logical impossibilities, assigning
them a probability of zero. In turn, this artificially increases the estimated probability
of all other cells, thus inducing an under-estimation of the true risks (Skinner and
Shlomo, 2008). Alternatively, one could consider only log-linear models that avoid the
problematic cells—that is, ensure that no margin required for the model fitting has
zeros—but this limits the range of available models and thus can engender bias due to
over-smoothing. The Bayesian GoM model, in contrast, assumes that all cells have a
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positive probability regardless of the model complexity, so that it is more tolerant to
sparsity.
A different situation arises when some cells in the contingency table correspond
to impossible combinations of variables, so that their expected counts must be exactly
zero. These structural zeros are easy to account for during maximum likelihood estima-
tion of hierarchical log-linear models using algorithms such as Iterative Proportional
Fitting (see Bishop et al., 1975). No such direct approaches exist for models based
on conditional exchangeability like GoM models. Our current implementation of the
Bayesian GoM model does not treat structural zeros differently from random zeros.
This can result in biased estimates in the presence of many structural zeros. Hence,
for the moment, we recommend that agencies use the GoM approach only for datasets,
or subsets of datasets, for which structural zeros are not present. For example, in
the California PUMS data we estimated disclosure risks only for adults, so that the
(massive) numbers of zeros in the sample tables are all random and not structural. We
currently are working on extensions to the GoM MCMC sampler algorithms to account
for structural zeros, generalizing ideas from Manrique-Vallier and Fienberg (2008) that
we believe can be directly applied to the problem of estimating population uniques.
Fitting the GoM models via MCMC can be computationally intensive, especially
with large samples and large numbers of extreme profiles. In the empirical study, we
typically needed around 400, 000 MCMC iterations before reaching stationary distri-
butions, after which long runs—typically around 300,000 iterations—were needed to
obtain adequate posterior samples due to high autocorrelations in the chains. This con-
trasts with the application of log-linear models, for which efficient MLE algorithms like
Iterative Proportional Fitting exist. With the most demanding dataset (n = 10, 000),
our personal computers required around 21 hours to fit a single GoM model. The
entire stepwise model selection with log-linear models took around 9 hours. We sped
up the GoM model selection (i.e., fit GoM for multiple values of K) by running the
required chains in parallel, using idle capacity on networked computers. For practical
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applications with similarly large datasets, we recommend running the MCMC chains
in parallel, taking advantage of multicore processors and computer clusters.
Given the disparity in model complexity and running times, a referee of this article
questioned whether or not the gains in accuracy from the GoM approach are worth the
effort. While this judgment obviously sits with the agency estimating disclosure risks,
in many cases we believe that the answer should be affirmative. Accurate disclosure
risk estimation is important: significant underestimation of risk could lead to releases
with unnecessarily high risks of disclosure, and significant overestimation could lead
to unnecessary disclosure treatment. Additionally, in many studies, it can take many
months and even years to complete the cycle from data collection to data dissemina-
tion, including time for quality checking, preparing data documentation, etc. With
computing times on the order of just several hours, we suspect that many agencies
would be more than willing to let a computer run longer to realize the accuracy gains
in risk estimation apparent from the GoM approach.
We investigated a method for approximate inference with the GoM approach that
is less computationally intensive based on mean field variational techniques. Similar
methods have been successfully applied in other large scale, mixed membership settings
(e.g., Blei et al., 2003; Blei and Lafferty, 2007; Airoldi et al., 2007). The estimates of
disclosure risk quantities obtained from the variational approximations were unreliable,
often being very far from the true values of τ . We believe that this is due to the fact
that these variational techniques rely on a global approximation to the likelihood using
a surrogate distribution—which minimizes the KL-divergence with the target distribu-
tion within a tractable family—that does not necessarily represent well all regions of
the target likelihood, particularly with modest sample sizes. This is especially prob-
lematic for disclosure risk estimation, since the relevant measures depend on accurately
estimating cells with very small probability. Hence, we do not generally recommend
variational approximations for this setting.
Our application of the GoM model to the estimation of disclosure risk quantities
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assumes simple random sampling. It must be modified for samples obtained through
complex designs. For stratified simple random sample designs with just a few strata,
one way of accounting for the design is to introduce the strata labels as covariate
information through the population level common distribution of membership scores,
similar to the method for incorporating cohort information in Manrique-Vallier (2010).
Alternatively, when sample sizes are large enough within strata, GoM models can be
estimated separately in each stratum. For more general complex designs, Bertolet
(2008) has proposed a set of extensions to the basic GoM model with binary responses
that we believe can be extended for multinomial responses.
As a final remark, we note that improved methodology for disclosure risk estimation
in simple random samples has benefits for broader data collection contexts. For ex-
ample, determining population uniqueness is a major concern of government agencies
considering the release of data collected without random sampling, such as administra-
tive records and disease registries (henceforth all called registry data). These agencies
seek to prevent intruders from identifying individuals in the registry by matching on
known keys. However, since registry data typically are not representative of the whole
population, agencies cannot simply fit log-linear or GoM models to the registry data
and expect to get reasonable estimates of disclosure risk quantities. Instead, as sug-
gested by Yu et al. (2011), agencies can identify large surveys with keys that are
also in the registry data, like the Census Public Use Microdata Samples (PUMS) and
American Community Survey (ACS), and estimate population counts for the table of
common keys. The agency then can determine how many and which records in the
registry match on the keys corresponding to the estimated population uniques. GoM
models can be readily applied in this setting, since the PUMS and ACS are essentially
stratified simple random samples. Since the tables of survey data for the specific reg-
istry sites will be large and sparse, we anticipate that GoM models would offer more
accurate estimates of population uniqueness than log-linear models, and hence lead to
better decisions about what registry data can be released to the public.
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